我国集体林权竞争市场中交易行为博弈分析

Game Behavior Analysis of Collective Forests Property Right Transaction in Competitive Market

对集体林权制度改革后林权交易追踪调查显示,林改后林权交易量没有明显上升,林权高度分散与林业规模经营之间矛盾日益突出。通过对林权出让者和受让者构建不完全信息静态博弈模型,推导了交易双方的最优化条件和纳什均衡概率,剖析了影响林权交易行为的构成要素,指出交易成本高、采伐限额管理刚性约束、比较利益或机会成本的差异是造成林权交易不旺的主要原因,同时提出了建立降低林权交易成本的制度环境、改革林木采伐管理制度、允许农户自发流转和弱化政府行政权力的政策建议。

Since the reform of collective forest property right system in China, the volume of the right transaction volume did not significantly increased, and the contradiction between the forest ownership decentralization and the forestry large-scale management became serious. Through transaction game model analysis, this paper inferred the optimized condition of transaction players and the Nash balanced probability, and analyzed the integrant elements of forests transaction behavior. High transaction cost, rigidity woodcutting quota management, and different comparative advantages and opportunity costs were primary reasons which bring about dull forests transaction market. Suggestions in policy making were put forward, such as reducing transaction cost, reforming wood-cutting system, allowing spontaneously circulation by family household, and attenuating government administration authority.