摘要
本文首先对金融领域洗钱犯罪进行定义,并对金融洗钱的过程以及表现出来的特征进行了分析,在此基础上构建一个洗钱者与商业银行、商业银行与监管机构之间的博弈模型,讨论了在完全信息情形下和不完全信息情形下的博弈均衡,并对博弈模型的参数变化进行了分析,为我国金融机构的反洗钱监管提供了理论支撑。最后针对金融机构反洗钱监管机制研究提出合理化的政策建议。
Firstly, this paper gives the definition of money laundering in financial sector, and then analyzes the whole process of money laundering and the features it manifests. Based on it, a game theory model is established between money launderers and commercial banks, regulatory authority and commercial banks to discuss the game equilibrium under complete and incomplete information circumstances respectively. Meanwhile, the changes of parameters in the game theory model have been analyzed to provide theoretical support for anti-money laundering supervision. Last, some appropriate political recommendations are provided to perfect anti-money laundering supervision system in financial institutions.
出处
《中山大学研究生学刊(社会科学版)》
2011年第2期120-128,共9页
Journal of the Graduates Sun YAT-SEN University(Social Sciences)
关键词
洗钱
博弈论
反洗钱
Money laundering
Game theory
Anti-money laundering