风险厌恶下的供应链收益共享契约协调模型研究

Coordinating Supply Chain by Revenue-sharing Contract with a Risk-averse Member

收益共享契约是实现供应链系统绩效改善或完美协调的一种机制.考虑了零售商与供应商分别具有风险厌恶决策偏好情况下,在随机市场需求下建立了由单供应商和单零售商组成的二级供应链的收益共享契约模型,并对模型进行了分析,揭示了供应商和零售商的风险厌恶决策偏好对收益共享契约参数的影响.研究结果表明:当销售商(供应商)的风险厌恶控制在一定程度内时,通过调整收益共享契约参数,可以保证供应链的协调.

Revenue-Sharing （RS） contract is a kind of mechanism to improve the performance of supply chain （SC）. considering that a supplier or a retailer has risk-averse preferences, this paper proposed a model of an SC contract aimed at co- ordinating a two-level SC, which is based on revenue sharing mechanism, and the customer demand is stochastic. Then by ana- lyzing the model, this paper explained that how the risk-averse preferences of the supplier and the retailer influenced the opti- mal order quantity, the optimal wholesale price, and the quota of the revenue sharing and SC coordination. The result shows, if the risk-aversion of the retailer （or the supplier） can be controlled within the specific limits, the RS contract also can coordi- nate SC by tuning its parameters.