弹性需求下交通BOT项目特许期决策

Decision-Making on Concession Period for Traffic BOT Project under Elastic Demand

为解决弹性需求条件下的特许期决策问题,本文以交通BOT项目为研究对象,以实现政府社会消费者总剩余最大化与项目公司收益净现值最大化为决策目标,构建了完全信息动态博弈模型。求解出模型的精炼纳什均衡解,针对均衡解的性质展开讨论,从价格弹性视角分析了交通量需求变动对特许期决策的影响。最后,通过算例对特许期决策模型和均衡解的性质进行了验证。

Recently,BOT（build-operate-transfer） which could relieve the government＇s financial burden and improve operating efficiency becomes an important method to operate the traffic infrastructure projects,and related researches of decision-making on concession period for traffic BOT project rapidly attract broad attention of both academic and practical field.The existing decision-making models of concession period usually ignore the price elasticity of traffic demand.In fact,traffic demand varies with the price and further affects the decision-making on concession period under the circumstances of multiple parallel toll roads in the same area or multiple toll bridges on the same river.Therefore,it is necessary to consider the price elasticity of traffic demand while making decision on concession period for traffic BOT projects.In the first part,the research takes traffic BOT projects as research subject,and develops a dynamic game model of complete information with several hypotheses to maximize government＇s total consumer surplus and to maximize project company＇s net present value of revenue respectively.In the second part,the backward induction is used to solve the perfect Nash equilibrium solution of the model,and the government＇s optimal choice of concession period and project company＇s optimal choice of concession price are achieved.……In the third part,three properties of the equilibrium solution are concluded,and the effects of traffic demand variation on concession period＇s decision-making are analyzed from the price elasticity point of view.If the traffic demand function is given,the optimal concession period and optimal concession price exist under the condition that the absolute value of price elasticity of traffic demand is greater than one;if other parameters are fixed,the concession period extends with the construction cost＇s increase,and the concession price decreases with the construction cost＇s increase;if the traffic capacity and construction standards are given,an upper limit of project company＇s construction cost exists.Under the condition of traffic demand change,decision-makers should choose the corresponding adjustment strategy of concession period according to the price elasticity and traffic capacity of the concession agreement＇s price on the new demand curve.In the fourth part,an example of highway BOT project is applied to demonstrate the decision-making model of concession period and the properties of equilibrium solution.In summary,the research takes traffic BOT projects as research subject,considers the concession period and concession price as decision variables of the government and project company respectively,and further develops a dynamic game model of complete information to maximize government＇s total consumer surplus and project company＇s net present value of revenue respectively with consideration of the price elasticity of traffic demand.The perfect Nash equilibrium solution of the model is solved,the equilibrium solution＇s properties are discussed and the impact of traffic demand variation on concession period＇s decision-making is analyzed from the price elasticity point of view.Finally,an example is applied to demonstrate the decision-making model of concession period and the equilibrium solution＇s properties.These conclusions provide the government with a new way to make decision on concession period for traffic BOT projects.