自由现金流代理成本假说还是过度自信假说?——中国上市公司投资——现金流敏感性的实证研究

Free Cash Flow Agency Hypothesis or Managerial Overconfidence Hypothesis:Empirical research on Investment-cash Flow Sensitivities of Chinese Listed Companies

企业投资现金流敏感性问题可以由现金流代理假说解释,也可以由管理者过度自信假说解释,本文以企业的成长性、现金流特征为划分指标对企业进行分组,并以此来区分与检验两种理论假说。研究结果显示,自由现金流代理问题较为严重的低成长—高现金流企业,将会发生企业过度投资。同样,过度自信问题较为严重的高成长—高现金流企业,也将发生企业过度投资。实证研究结果即支持了自由现金流代理假说,也支持了过度自信假说。

As one of the more focus issues of corporate finance today,corporate investment cash flow sensitivity is the important manifestation of corporate inefficiency capital allocation,and it also reflects the governing efficiency of corporate governance.There are two main different explanations to corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity from perspective of managerial behavior;those are Free Cash Flow Agency Cost Hypothesis and Managerial Overconfidence Hypothesis.However,the existing researches on corporate investment-free cash flow sensitivity are most tested from one angel of managerial behavior,as from managerial agency or managerial overconfidence,and the testing results are all significant.This makes the improvement of corporate governance which was designed on managerial behavior in trouble.So,it is essential for distinguishing the managerial behavior drivers of corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity. The paper grouped the China＇s listed firm sample by making pair of the indexes of corporate free cash and firm growth,that is,the group charactering with higher free cash flow and lower growth opportunities will be more likely trapped by managerial agency,then,we definite such the group as free cash flow agency cost group;meanwhile,the group charactering with higher free cash flow and higher growth opportunities will be more likely trapped by managerial overconfidence,then,we definite such group as the managerial overconfidence group.Hereafter,we distinguish the two hypothesizes by empirically testing the hypothesis of free cash flow managerial agency cost and managerial overconfidence based on the structured empirical model. The testing outcomes indicate that the relationship between the cash flow and overinvestment is positive,and the relationship between managerial overconfidence and overinvestment is also positive,and the relationship is invariant even it being tested in the mixed model of the cash flow agency cost and managerial overconfidence.Besides,the relationship between managerial behavioral and corporate overinvestment tested in consideration of the corporate characters is also robust,it implies that the corporate investment-cash flow sensitivity of China＇s listed firms are partly from managerial agency,and partly from managerial overconfidence. So,how to strengthen monitor system on the drivers of corporate inefficiency investment of managerial agency with consideration of managerial overconfidence,and then improving corporate governance,radically reducing corporate inefficiency investment,so as top protect investors＇ benefit.These important problems that are hardly needed to solution immediately.