双边市场条件下的技术许可策略研究

Technology Licensing in Two-Sided Markets

本文研究了双边市场条件下交叉网络外部性强度、潜在受许方数量及潜在市场需求规模对创新者技术许可策略的影响,分析了创新者实施有数量限制与无数量限制的固定许可策略的条件以及实施技术补贴的条件,并比较了固定许可策略与变动许可策略。研究表明,在双边市场条件下,创新者在技术市场实施固定许可策略一般情况下优于变动许可策略。但是当交叉网络外部性强度与潜在受许方数量较大,而授权产品市场相对于创新者自身产品市场的潜在需求规模较小时,创新者实施负变动许可费的技术补贴策略有可能优于固定许可策略。本文的研究对于在交叉网络外部性环境下创新者或技术平台的技术许可策略决策具有参考意义。

Two-sided markets include a system platform and two groups of clients who interact with each other via two-sided network externalities—the expansion of one market can increase customers＇ utilities in the other market.Technology licensing decisions are important in the network economy because two-sided network externalities are prevalent.The purpose of the paper is to investigate innovators＇ optimal technology licensing strategies under two-sided markets. We assume that an innovator has major patented technologies that are manufactured for Product I market,but licensed in Product II market.The scenario shows that two-sided network externalities between the two markets exist.We explore how factors,such as the intensity of two-sided network externalities,the number of potential licensees and the potential demand effect,can influence the technology licensing strategies of innovators.We establish a two-stage game model and adopt the fulfilled expectation equilibrium theory to analyze market equilibrium. First,we discuss the fixed-fee licensing strategy and analyze the optimal number of licenses for an innovator.We find that an innovator will not restrict the number of licenses in the licensed product market when the following conditions exist： strong two-sided network externalities,small potential licensee numbers,and relatively small potential demand scale in the licensed product market.Without the presence of these conditions,an innovator will restrict the number of licensees.Second,we discuss the royalty licensing strategy.We find that the innovator will decrease the royalty rate when two-sided network externalities and the potential number of licensees increase,and when the potential demand in the licensed product market decreases.Third,we discuss the probability of technological subsidies provided by innovators.An innovator may subsidize licensees with negative royalty rates.Furthermore,an innovator＇s subsidizing strategy may promote licensees to implement price subsidies for customers of the licensed products.Finally,we compare the fixed-fees licensing strategy with the royalty licensing strategy,and discuss optimal licensing strategy for innovators.We find that the fixed-fees regime dominates the royalty regime in two-sided markets.However,under some conditions the subsidizing strategy（negative royalty rate） may dominate the fixed-fees licensing strategy. In summary,we analyze the following two conditions：（1） entry is not restricted with the fixed-fees licensing strategy,and（2） an innovator subsidizes licensees in two-sided markets.Then we compare the fixed-fees strategy with the royalty strategy.Our comparison shows that the fixed-fees regime dominates the royalty regime in two-sided markets.However,an innovator may subsidize licensees with negative royalty rates,and subsidizing strategy may dominate the fixed-fees licensing strategy in the following conditions： strong two-sided network externalities,more potential licensee numbers and relatively small potential demand scale in the licensed products market.Our research provides insights for innovators to make effective licensing decisions in two-sided markets.