审计监督、最终控制人性质与税收激进度

Audit Supervision,Property of Ultimate Controller and Tax Aggressiveness

新兴市场中的企业税收激进活动受到所有权性质与政府干预等转轨因素的影响。审计以特有的监督与治理功能可以有效地制约企业税收激进活动。本文主要探讨审计作为公司外部治理机制对税收激进活动具有的监督作用,以及这种监督制约作用在不同企业所有权环境下的表现差异。通过对中国A股上市公司2002—2009年相关数据进行经验研究发现,高质量外部审计可以有效制约企业税收激进活动,且这种制约作用在不同最终控制人性质企业存在显著差异,基于政治关联程度与融资约束差异,审计监督对非国有企业税收激进活动的治理效率更突出。因此,提高审计对整体税收激进的监督效率,需要强化审计对国有企业税收活动的监管。

Corporate aggressive tax activities in emerging markets are influenced by property of ultimate controller and government intervention etc.. Audit can effectively restrict the activities with its specific supervision and governance function. This paper focuses on how audit as an outside governance mechanism constrains corporate aggressive tax activities and the difference of constraint between SOEs and private companies. Our empirical researches by using the data from 2002 to 2009 of China＇s A share listed companies suggest that the quality of audit supervision can limit the aggressive tax activities, and the restraint effect in SOEs and that in private firms are different. Based on the level of political connection and financing constraint, high quality of audit supervision makes more significant effect on corporate aggressive tax activities in private firms. Therefore, it＇s necessary to strengthen audit supervision on SOEs tax activities to improve the audit supervision efficiency on tax aggressiveness.