我国上市公司会计造假行为的博弈分析

Game Analysis on Chinese Listed Companies' Behavior of Accounting Fraud

上市公司财务报告的提供是多个参与者博弈的"囚徒困境"。本文通过对上市公司管理层与外勤审计、监管机构的博弈分析,认为仅靠加大对会计造假主体的行政处罚并不能从长期遏制上市公司的会计造假行为,而应从多方面入手,从制度上缩小造假收益和造假成本之间的差距,重点是加大造假的机会成本。

The provision of financial reports by listed company is the game of ＂prisoner＇s dilemma＂ involving multiple participants.Actually,the results of the Nash equilibrium is（false,false）,books cooked so commonly.However,it can＇t eliminate accounting fraud in the long term only to increase administrative penalties.We should seek multi-pronged approach,aiming at narrowing the huge gap between fraud costs and benefits,whereas the focus is to increase the opportunity costs of fraud.