期刊文献+

经济组织内部创新的演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis on Internal Innovation Activities in Economic Organizations
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摘要 组织内部的创新成果往往具有公共品性质,因而容易引起员工创新投入的不足。应用演化博弈理论,从员工创新收益、搭便车收益和创新成果间互补性三者关系的角度分析了经济组织内部创新活动的长期演化趋势和稳定状态。进一步地,针对不同的组织内部创新环境提出相应的改进建议,为创新水平的提高提供参考借鉴。 The achievements of internal innovation in organizations always have the properties of public goods,which may lead to the insufficient investment by individual employees. By applying the theory of evolutionary game ,this paper analyzes the long-term evo- lutionary tendency and stable state of internal innovation activities in economic organizations from the perspective of the relationship a- mong the payoff of individual innovation, free-riding and complementarity of the innovation achievements. Further, this paper presents corresponding improving suggestions for internal innovation environment of different organizations ,which can provide a reference for the improvement of innovation level.
出处 《科技与经济》 CSSCI 2011年第5期16-20,共5页 Science & Technology and Economy
基金 国家自然科学基金项目--"基于控制权动态配置的投融资双方激励相容机制设计:可转债融资契约视角"(项目编号:70972101 项目负责人:万迪昉)成果之一
关键词 经济组织 内部创新 公共品 搭便车 演化博弈 economic organization internal innovation public goods free-riding evolutionary game
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