投标人平行串谋与最优公开保留价博弈分析

Game Analysis of Bidders' Parallel Collusion and the Optimal Public Reserve Price

本文将投标人平行串谋问题与招标人公开保留价定价策略相结合,研究了第二价格密封招标方式下投标串谋联盟的串谋报价及利润分配机制,分析了串谋联盟的存在对非串谋联盟中成员的投标策略和期望利润的影响,揭示了串谋联盟成员人数与串谋联盟总收益之间的关系,探讨了招标人公开保留价定价策略、串谋联盟成员人数与招标公开保留价之间的关系,指出了招标人应通过降低公开保留价的方式来防止或减少投标人平行串谋行为的发生。

From this point of bidders＇ parallel collusion, this paper studies the second - price sealed bidding optimal public pricing strategy. First, this paper gives the bidding price and the profit distribution mechanism of the conspiracy alliance. Second, this paper analyzes how the presence of conspiracy alliance affects the bidding strategies and the expected profit, and reveals the relationship between the number of collusion and the total revenue. Finally, this paper obtains the relationship between the number of collusion members and the optimal public reserve price, and points out that the tenders should prevent collusion by reducing the public reserve price.