盈余管理、诉讼风险与审计费用溢价

Earnings Management,Litigation Risk and Audit Fee Premium

以沪深两市A股上市公司2006-2008年经验数据,运用完全信息非对称动态纳什博弈模型,考察了公司客户在诉讼风险约束下盈余管理与审计费用溢价的作用机理。实证结果发现:在控制其他因素的影响后,诉讼风险不对称性会导致上市公司减少(增加)收入的盈余管理与审计费用溢价负(正)相关,正向盈余管理比同幅度负向盈余管理产生较弱的审计费用溢价效应,高增长型客户正向盈余管理导致的审计费用溢价效应在诉讼风险环境中被扩大。这表明审计师在风险导向审计模式下充分考虑了公司诉讼风险的不对称性,修正了审计的风险判断。

The paper analyses the process mechanism between earnings management and audit fee premium under asymmetry litigation risk environment, using 2006-2008 data on A-stock companies listed on SZ and SH Stock Exchange, and complete information dynamics game model. The results disclose that income-increasing （income-decreasing） discretionary accruals are positive （negative） relevant with audit fee premium, audit fee premium created from negative earning management is larger than that from positive earning management, as well as audit fee premium effects resulting from a client＇ s propensity to manage earnings upward are magnified for clients within greater litigation risk environments as identified by high-growth clients.