安全联盟与经济合作研究——基于四种联盟类型的分析被引量：12

Security Alliance and Economic Cooperation:Based on Analysis of Alliance Typology

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摘要联盟建立的初衷是为了满足国家在安全上的需要。但在无政府状态的国际社会中,经济交往产生的安全外部性促进了结盟国家间贸易往来的增加,确保了联盟国家间经济交往的发展;在联盟建立和发展过程中,联盟框架内存在的议题联系机制为联盟国家之间进行安全合作的同时实现经济合作提供了相应的交往渠道和方式。同时,一国通过经济上的补偿性支付的方式向其盟国提供经济补偿,使其从经济上获益,从而确保了安全联盟的稳定。根据联盟成员间的相互依存度和利益相容性程度,联盟会表现为实力增强型联盟、协调型联盟、霸权型联盟和飘忽不定型联盟等四种类型,联盟经济在各种类型的联盟中都会发挥作用;但在不同类型的联盟中,由于上述两个变量的不同,经济合作与安全利益的关联程度会有不同的表现,补偿性支付也会发挥不同的作用。 Security thinking is the main purpose of alliance.Under the condition of anarchy,security externality produced by economic interaction will lead to trade development in the alliance.In this process,issue linkage provides the channel and means of communication for economic cooperation in the alliance.And the economic side-payment will compensate the allies and consolidate the alliance.Based on the interdependence among allies and compatibility of interests,there are four types of alliance-economy:aggregation alliance,concert alliance,hegemonic alliance and ambivalent alliance.Given different type of alliance,the relationship between security interest and economic cooperation will have different impact and the economic side-payment have different functions.

作者杨毅

机构地区北京外国语大学国际关系学院

出处《世界经济与政治》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第10期137-154,160,共18页 World Economics and Politics

基金教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(11YJCGJW021) 北京外国语大学"211工程"三期建设项目(0502B03)的研究成果

关键词联盟安全外部性议题联系补偿性支付 alliance,security externality,issue linkage,side-payment

分类号 D80 [政治法律—外交学]

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参考文献53

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二级参考文献35

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