基于管理层视角的不确定性会计信息披露分析

现有的和潜在的投资者、债权人等需要不确定性的信息,来减少他们决策的不确定性,从而增加期望收益。但是,对于管理层来说,信息的披露有可能带来负面影响。因此,管理层在选择信息披露时会在信息披露带来的收益与产生的成本之间作出权衡,从而选择信息披露的程度。本文主要从管理层的角度,分析了管理层不会完全披露信息的原因,并运用成本恒定模型分析管理层信息披露程度。

Existing and potential investors,creditors,and others need probabilistic information to reduce uncertainty in their decision-making,thereby increase expected revenue.However,for management level,information disclosure might bring about negative impacts.As a result,management level tends to judge and weigh the benefits and costs due to information disclosure while they choose information disclosure to decide the degree of information disclosure.Mainly from the perspective of management level,this paper has analyzed the causes why management level are unwilling to disclose entire information and has applied the model of constant cost to analyze the degree of information disclosure by management level.