政府规制下的水权拍卖问题研究

A Study on Water Right Auction under Government Regulations

水资源短缺问题已成为影响我国社会经济发展的瓶颈问题,有必要通过水市场来提高水资源配置的效益。拍卖是确定水权市场交易价格的一种有效机制,但由于水资源自身的特性,必须要由政府对水权拍卖市场进行一定的规制。比较了政府规制下竞拍者为风险中性型时的水权第一价格拍卖和第二价格拍卖出价策略及卖方收益,同时分析了竞拍者为风险规避型条件下的水权第一价格拍卖和第二价格拍卖的出价策略及卖方收益。两种情况的分析结果表明:水权拍卖者往往会在政府规制的前提下采用第一价格拍卖策略来提高自身的收益,同时会设定一个相对较高的拍卖保留价格,因此作为政府从提高整个水市场配置效率的角度还要对水权拍卖保留价格进行一定程度的规制。

The shortage of water resources has become a bottleneck in social and economic development in China. It is necessary to improve the revenue of water resources allocation through the water market trade. Auction is an effective mechanism to determine the price of the water right trade. Governments should regulate the market of the water right trade because of particular attributes of water resources, such as the attribute of quasi-public goods and externalities. The bid strategy and seller’s revenue of the first price auction （FPA） and second price auction （SPA） under government regulations were analyzed when the bidders belong to different risk-preference. Some important conclusions were drawn. The regulation of governments to the market of the water right trade includes auction price regulation and bid price allowance. First, it was proposed that the government should provide bid price allowance to the users of agriculture. Then the users of agriculture can compete with the users of industry fairly in the water right auction market. The effectiveness and efficiency of different industries can be improved to varying degrees. Second, a model of sealed price auction was constructed in a water right auction market, which is composed of a seller and n-buyers. If the buyers of water right are risk-neutral and the auction is very frequent to the seller, it is not important to choose FPA or SPA. From the perspective of long-term revenue, it is the same to the seller. But if the auction is just one time, the risk of revenue of choosing FPA is smaller than choosing SPA to the seller. So the seller of one time water right trade prefers to choose FPA. If the bidders of water right are risk aversion, the bid price of buyers will be higher than it in the risk-neutral situation if the seller chooses FPA. It means that the revenue of the seller will be improved. But if SPA is adopted, the bid price will be the same to it in the risk-neutral situation. The revenue of the seller will keep the same. It is shown that the revenue of FPA is bigger than SPA to the seller when the bidders are risk aversion. So FPA is a better choice to the seller when the seller cannot identify the bidders’ preference. At the same time, the model of FPA shows that the seller will keep a high reserve price in water right auction in order to maximize his revenue. Therefore, the government should regulate the reserve price to improve the efficiency of water resources allocation.