自然垄断产业经营者的薪酬激励机制研究——基于不同风险偏好经营者的委托代理理论

企业所有权与经营控制权的分离带来了委托代理问题,对经营者薪酬进行激励是解决此问题的有效办法之一。基于委托代理理论,突出针对经营者的利益偏好差异,应制定不同的薪酬激励设计,对企业管理中影响薪酬的因素进行分析,在此基础上对我国自然垄断企业管理者薪酬机制的优化提出建议。

Business ownership and management control over the separation of principal - agent problem brought, paying the in- centive for operators is a way to solve this problem. This article is based on principal - agent theory, highlighting the benefits for operators of different preferences and interests of the preference should be for different incentive compensation design, business management analysis of the factors affecting pay, on the basis of China＇s natural monopoly business managers pay system optimization recommendations.