意见分歧与企业融资方式选择——基于并购事件

Disagreement and the Selection of Corporate Financing Patterns——Based on M&A Events

以上市公司2003～2007年的385次并购投资事件为样本,放松传统资本结构理论中的同质信念假设,首次运用并购前后的累积超额收益来构建意见分歧的替代变量。分析管理者和投资者对于并购投资的未来收益存在意见分歧是否会导致企业采取激进的债务融资方式。结果表明意见分歧程度与公司总负债率正相关,即管理者和投资者之间的意见分歧会导致企业的激进负债行为。此外,意见分歧越大的公司越倾向于采取短期债务融资方式。

Taking 385 MA events in listed companies from 2003 to 2007 as our example,relax the Homogeneous beliefs assumption in traditional theory about capital structure and use the cumulative excess returns before and after MA to build an alternative variable of disagreement.Then we analyze whether disagreement between managers and investors on the acquisition future earnings will cause an enterprise to adopt aggressive debt financing.Empirical analysis shows that there is a direct correlation between the degree of disagreement and asset-liability ratio.That is to say disagreement between managers and investors will lead to the company＇s aggressive debt behavior.Furthermore,The greater the degree of disagreement,the more likely the enterprise is to take short-term debt financing.