基于不完全契约理论视角的外包服务商的管理

Based on Incomplete Contract Theory Perspective of Business Management Outsourcing Services

企业在与外包服务商签订完外包合同之后,需要对这种外包关系进行有效的管理,恰当的监督与激励是防范服务商机会主义行为的有效途径。通过运用不完全契约理论对服务外包不完全契约性的分析,揭示了这种不完全契约性给服务外包带来的影响,认为企业与外包服务商要建立起一种以正式的外包合同为基础,关系合同为补充的激励机制,并运用完善的服务商风险防范机制对服务商进行监督。

Corporate and outseureing service providers in outsourcing contracts signed after completion, this would require the effective management of outseurcing relationships, appropriate supervision and incentives to guard against opportunistic behavior of service providers an effective way. Through the use of incomplete contract theory of incomplete contractual outsonreing analysis, revealed that incomplete contract of service outseureing to the impact of that business and outseureing service providers to establish a formal outsourcing contract basis , the contract for the complementary relationship between the incentives and the use of sound risk prevention mechanism for service providers to monitor service providers.