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刑讯逼供的规制策略研究——法经济学视角

Regulative Strategies Against Extorting a Confession by Torture:From Legal Economics Perspective
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摘要 通过构建警察与犯罪嫌疑人之间的博弈模型并进行分析,指出应减少刑讯逼供的收益并增加其成本。这可以通过适用"毒树之果"规则、要求承担侵权责任及适用举证责任倒置规则来实现。可考虑利用辩诉交易制度来激励犯罪嫌疑人主动交代案情。 The article establishes a game model between the police and the suspect, makes an analysis of the game, and points out that gains from torture for a confession should be decreased and cost be increased, which we can achieve by applying the "fruit of the poisonous tree" rule to demand the suspect to bear tort liability and applying the rule of reverse burden of proof. We can consider the use of plea bargain to encourage the suspect to make a confession.
作者 刘廷华
出处 《北京政法职业学院学报》 2011年第3期24-29,共6页 Journal of Beijing College of Politics and Law
关键词 刑讯逼供 博弈 毒树之果 侵权责任 举证责任倒置 extorting a confession by torture game fruit of the poisonous tree tort liability reverseburden of proof
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