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委托代理理论抑或行为科学?——相对业绩评价理论基础的实证检验 被引量:6

Agency Theory or Behavioral Sciences? Determinants of Relative Performance Evaluation
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摘要 理论解释的丰富和经验证据的薄弱导致了相对业绩评价之谜,而何种理论能解释相对业绩评价实践则是解开这一谜团的首要问题。本文通过对影响相对业绩评价使用的前因变量进行实证检验,比较了何种理论更适用于解释相对业绩评价。基于396份问卷调查数据,检验了相对业绩评价使用中的环境不确定性、信息不对称、竞争程度、管理会计系统的使用范围和被评价者的抵制态度等因素,结果发现,竞争程度和被评价者的抵制态度等行为科学因素具有稳定的解释力,而剔除环境不确定性和信息不对称等经济因素稳定性较弱。结论说明,相比于经济学的委托代理理论,行为科学对相对业绩评价的使用具有更强的解释力。 The Relative performance evaluation (RPE, hereafter) puzzle arises from contradictions between the rich theory interpretation and lack of empirical evidences. While which theory can explain the RPE exercise is the first step to solve this puzzle. Using 396 questionnaire data, we explore causes why implements RPE. Results find that, compared to environment uncertainty, information asymmetry and using scope of managerial accounting sys- tem, the relation between competition, resist attitude of the respondents and the use of RPE are more significant and stable. The result shows that behavioral sciences' explanation has more power then agency theory to explain the RPE use.
作者 王剑 陈运森
出处 《经济管理》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第10期58-69,共12页 Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )
关键词 相对业绩评价 委托代理理论 行为科学 relative performance evaluation agency theory behavioral science
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参考文献29

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