我国企业高管侵占型职务犯罪的机理研究

Research on the Mechanism of Post Embezzlement Crime by Chinese Corporate Executives

自上世纪我国建立证券市场以来,企业高级管理人员的职务犯罪逐渐呈频发之势。高管的职务犯罪中侵占型职务犯罪数量最多,案情也最为复杂。本文着重分析与论述了侵占型职务犯罪的机理并提出有效的防范措施。导致企业高管侵占型职务犯罪的机理是:两权分离条件下对经营者财产经营责任约束的弱化及"道德风险"、契约的不完备、经理人市场机制的缺陷。公有制下对经营者财产经营责任约束的疲软、经理人市场的缺乏、薪酬与激励机制的不合理以及必要的均衡价格的缺失等,使得企业高管侵占型职务犯罪在所难免。要很好地解决企业高管侵占型职务犯罪的问题,就应完善内部治理结构,健全市场机制,完善相关法律法规、加强监督等。

Since the establishment of China＇s securities market in the last century, duty crime by corporate executives becomes increasingly frequent. Post Embezzlement Crime committed in the largest number among the duty crime by corporate executives and the cases are also the most complex. This paper will focus on the mechanism of post embezzlement crime by corporate executives and proposing effective preventive measures. The mechanisms that causing the post embezzlement crime by corporate executives include： the weakened constraints of the operator＇s property responsibility under the conditions of separation of ownership and management, the ＂Moral hazard＂, the incompleteness of contracts, shortcomings of managers market mechanisms, unreasonable salaries and incentives and the lack of the necessary equilibrium price, etc. All these caused executives post embezzlement crimes inevitable. In order to resolve the issue of business executive＇s occupation type crimes, we should perfect the internal governance structure, improve market mechanisms, perfect relevant laws and regulations, and strengthen supervision.