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中国公司股权集中度变化趋势及环境条件分析 被引量:3

An Analysis of the Equity Concentration's Changing Trend and It's Environment Conditions in China's Company
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摘要 中国公司不论是上市公司还是非上市国有与民营公司,都具有股权高度集中的显著特征。而股权高度集中与中国公司治理结构存在的种种缺陷在很大程度上是一种因果关联。随着经济与证券市场的发展,股权呈现出由集中向分散发展的变化趋势。股权相对分散使公司治理的内部与外部机制更能充分地发挥监督制衡作用,是当代公司相对理想的一种选择。股权集中度的变化需要一定的环境与条件创造,如法律制度的完善、资本市场与经理人市场的发展等。尤其应借鉴国外法律,赋予创始股东更多话语权与控制权,促进股权相对分散局面形成。 There is a remarkable feature in China that highly centralized equity exists in both the listed and non-listed companies no matter it is state-owned or private.It is a reason in a large extent that the highly centralized equity is closely related with the defects of corporate governance structure.With the development of economy and security market,there is a changing trend that the equity is becoming scattered from concentration.To scatter equity relatively is an ideal choice for companies today,because the internal management mechanism and exterior governance mechanism can play supervision and restraint function.The change of equity concentration needs certain environment conditions such as the perfection of legal system,the development of capital market and professional manager market and so on.We shall learn experience from foreign legal system to endow with discourse power and control power to the funding shareholders,which can form the equity to be relatively scattered.
作者 马立行
出处 《社会科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第10期39-44,共6页 Journal of Social Sciences
关键词 股权集中度 变化趋势 创始股东话语权 资本市场 股权相对分散 Equity Concentration Changing Trend Funding Shareholders' Discourse Power Capital Market Relatively Scattered Equity
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参考文献7

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