摘要
本文研究发现定向增发10.5%的正宣告效应是大股东支持和利益输送预期影响的净效果,大股东支持效应能够解释宣告时19.5%的股价波动,而利益输送预期能够解释2.5%的价格波动。市场化机制下大股东依据向上市公司提供的支持和中小股东议定折价,因此折价是大股东支持力度的代理变量。对于利益输送行为的监管应当重点关注定向增发实施后的其他类型交易。
In a muhi-period setting, we find that the propping and tunneling from large shareholders coexist for listed firms. Evidence indicates that the positive announcement effect of PIPEs is actually the net effect of propping and tunneling expectations. We quantify that about 19.5% of the volatility in abnormal returns around announcements of PIPE events can be explained by propping, while 2.5% can be explained by tunneling expectation. That does not support the argument that the discounts in the prices of privately placed shares reflect only the magnitude of tunneling, sinee the price discount appears as a result of the bargaining between large and other shareholders. We advocate a financial policy that encourages PIPE, while curbs the behaviors of large shareholders to hurt the interest of minority shareholders.
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第10期119-129,共11页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家教育部新教师基金项目"股东积极主义的价值"(批准号20091011103)
关键词
定向增发
大股东支持
利益输送
additional stock issuance
supported by big shareholders
interest transfer