一种基于攻防成本博弈的防御策略评价模型

A Evaluation Model of Defensive Strategy Based on Attack-Defense Game Cost

为了探求信息系统的最佳防御等级策略,从经济博弈论的全新角度研究信息安全攻防策略问题,提出一种基于"诱导迂回"的信息安全系统架构,建立基于攻防成本差异博弈的评价体系,以成本差异最大化为基点建立一种边界数学模型,刻画网络安全攻防矛盾,从而解决最佳防御策略的选取。通过仿真实验数据分析上述信息结构与模型。结果证明,提出的模型和系统结构是可行有效的,对于减少信息安全投资的盲目性、指导建设防御体系具有重要的实践意义。

In order to explore the optimal strategy of defense level of information system,it researches the problem of information safety from the view of economy game, and proposes an system structure of information security based on ＂inducible and circuitous tactics＂, and then establishes a evaluation system based on the game of the difference of attack-defense game, in which proposes a boundary mathematical model based on the difference of cost to depict the contradiction of attacker and defender. At last,it analyzes above structure and model through the typical experimental data. Results indicate that the structure and model is feasible and effective, and also has important practical significance to reduce the blindness of the investment and to direct the building of defense system.