摘要
This paper aims at analyzing the security issues that lie in the application layer (AL) protocols when users connect to the Internet via a wireless local area network (WLAN) through an access point. When adversaries launch deauthentication flood attacks cutting users' connection, the connection managers will automatically research the last access point's extended service set identifier (ESSID) and then re-establish connection. However, such re-connection can lead the users to a fake access point with the same ESSID set by attackers. As the attackers hide behind users' access points, they can pass AL's authentication and security schemes, e.g. secure socket layer (SSL). We have proved that they can even spy on users' account details, passwords, data and privacy.
This paper aims at analyzing the security issues that lie in the application layer （AL） protocols when users connect to the Internet via a wireless local area network （WLAN） through an access point. When adversaries launch deauthentication flood attacks cutting users＇ connection, the connection managers will automatically research the last access point＇s extended service set identifier （ESSID） and then re-establish connection. However, such re-connection can lead the users to a fake access point with the same ESSID set by attackers. As the attackers hide behind users＇ access points, they can pass AL＇s authentication and security schemes, e.g. secure socket layer （SSL）. We have proved that they can even spy on users＇ account details, passwords, data and privacy.
基金
the National Science Council (No. NSC-99-2219-E-033-001)
the Foundation of the Chung Yuan Christian University (1004) (No. CYCU-EECS.9801)
