试论自然种类词项的指称机制

A Tentative Study on the Referring Mechanism of Natural Kind Terms

从个体确定名称指称的角度看,描述论没有考虑个体对自然类对象的内在划分;因果论以所谓"直接指称"为特征,以因果链搁置对个体指称过程和经验的考察;混合论的两个主要分支都没有真正给出指称的机制,布朗对自然种类词项"成分问题"的解决也是不彻底的。本文将从各种名称理论中提炼出其关于自然种类词项指称机制解释中的直觉依赖,提出一个关于个体如何确定自然种类词项指称的"推理观",并初步检验其解释力。

From the perspective of an individual＇s fixing natural kind term reference,the descriptive theory doesn＇t pay any attention to one＇s intrinsic division of natural kind objects.Characterized by so-called ＂direct reference＂,the causal theory lays aside the study on the process and experience of the agent＇s referring.Essentially,neither of the two current hybrid theories gives rise to a real reference mechanism,nor does Brown give a final settlement to the ＂composition＂ problem.This paper will review some name theories,refine their intuition-dependant in interpreting the referring mechanism of natural kind terms,propose an ＂inferential view＂ of how an individual fix the reference of a natural kind term,and give a primary check to the new point＇s interpreting capacity.