薪酬体系框架与考核方式对个人绩效薪酬选择的影响

The Effects of Pay System Frame and Performance Appraisal on Individual’s Acceptance of Pay for Performance Plan

研究从行为决策视角,采用情景实验法探讨了薪酬体系框架与绩效考核方式对个人绩效薪酬选择的影响。结果表明:(1)个体根据实际收入水平低于/高于内心预期收入参照点将分别形成损失/收益性的预期收入框架,在损失性收入框架下选择风险性绩效薪酬的几率更高;(2)底薪加提成的薪酬支付模式会让个体形成收益框架,薪酬打包的支付模式会让个体形成损失框架,个体在薪酬打包模式下选择绩效薪酬体系的几率更高;(3)与封闭式目标的考核体系相比,企业采用开放式目标的绩效考核会抑制预期收入框架和薪酬支付框架对个人绩效薪酬选择的影响。

The compensation system of pay for performance has been widely applied by organizations as a mean to attract, motivate and sustain employees in modern business society. In theoretical field, too much attention has been drawn to the incentive effects of PFP on both individual and organizational performance while only a little work were conducted to explore the antecedents of employees’ reaction and acceptance of the PFP plan. Considered the risky context of PFP plan, this study initially examined two different pay system frame effects on individual’ acceptance of PFP plan in perspective of behavioral decision theory. More specifically, we hypothesized that an individual may have an anticipated income frame in which a gain/loss frame is formed when actual income level is more/less than his anticipated income level respectively. Also, two different payment modes of base ＋ performance pay and total – performance pay may lead an individual to form the positive and negative payment frame respectively. In situation of the loss frame in anticipated income and the negative frame in payment mode, individuals may more likely to accept the risky PFP plan according to rules of framing effect. Finally, the moderating effects of performance appraisal mode （open-goal and closed-goal） on above relationships were explored as well. A scenario experiment was used to test the hypotheses with a 2×2 between-subjects design, depicting two payment modes of positive/negative frame and two performance appraisal modes of openand closedgoal. 304 undergraduates from business and economic related majors were recruited and randomly assigned to each one of the four scenarios. In consideration of that the dependant variable, whether choose a PFP plan or a fixed pay plan, is a dummy variable, we implemented logistic regression to test hypotheses with controlling risk aversion, confidence of performance, self-efficacy, and other demographic attributes. The results of our study revealed that individuals were more likely to choose the risky PFP plan over the fixed pay plan when they are in situations of the loss frame ofincome anticipation and the negative payment mode, supporting the main pay system frame effects hypothesized in this study. Also, those two pay system frame effects on individuals’ acceptance of PFP plan were much weaker when an open-goal oriented performance appraisal system was applied. These findings extended extant research of behavioral decision to organizational compensation management and enriched the existed studies in area of employees’ compensation attitudes by introducing a new theoretical perspective as well. The practical implications of this study for organization change of performance pay were discussed.