官员腐败、审计师选择与公司价值

Official Corruption,The Selection of Auditor and Company's Value

本文根据近年来披露的腐败官员的案例为基础,以涉及省部级腐败官员的上市公司为样本,实证分析了官员腐败、审计师选择与公司价值三者之间的关系。研究发现,行贿的公司倾向于选择低质量的审计师,非行贿的公司倾向于选择高质量的审计师;行贿公司的公司价值在短期内显著高于非行贿公司;以审计师选择为传导机制与实现途径,官员腐败对公司价值的影响会显著提高。

The paper, based on the cases about the disclosure of corrupt officials, empirically analyzed the relationship among official corruption, the selection of auditor and company＇ s value, which took listed companies involving provincial-level corrupt officials as samples. The result showed that companies using bribery tended to choose auditor of low-quality, while those without bribery tended to the opposite; in short time, the value of company with bribery is higher than the one didn＇ t; the value of official corruption＇ s effort to the value of company will significantly increased when the company used selection of auditors as transmission mechanism and the way to achieve the effort.