银行资产结构对风险行为的影响——兼论银监会薪酬监管制度之缺陷

The Influence of the Bank Assets Structure on Risk-taking Activity——On the Defects of Supervision System on Salary of CBRC

银行特殊的资产结构使得银行的公司治理具有不同于一般企业的特点,特别是其薪酬安排制度,如果设计失当,会加剧高管、股东和债权人之间的利益冲突。对此,世界各国都开始对银行管理人员薪酬安排进行监管。中国银监会所颁布的监管措施,注重从数额上来对金融机构管理人员的薪酬予以控制,并不能够真正解决银行高管薪酬激励制度中的根源性问题,同时,这种以限薪为核心内容的监管反倒会在改善银行公司治理中管理层与股东之间代理问题方面得以倒退。

The special assets structure of the bank makes it different from common company in corporate government,especially the framework of compensation arrangements.If designed improper,it will aggravate the interest conflicts among executives,shareholders and creditors.As for this,most part of the countries in the world have been setting up various kinds of supervision systems.The supervison measures promulgated by the China Banking Regulatory Commission（CBRC） only pay attention to the amount of salary paid to the managers,ignoring the construction of salary incentive system,which is fundamental.To make it worse,it may bring about the agency problem between managers and shareholders.