内部职工在企业破产拍卖中的投标报价过高策略

Overbidding strategy for firm's staff in bankruptcy auctions

主要探讨作为破产企业第一债权人的破产企业内部职工在破产拍卖中的投标动机及投标策略对拍卖结果的影响,进而分析使破产企业内部职工债权得到清偿的最佳参与策略.通过分析得出结论:企业职工和外部投标人组成的投标联盟投标高于其真实估价.这种投标报价过高策略可以保证清算补偿中作为第一债权人的企业职工的工资和劳动保障费用得到有效的清偿.进而考虑了在投标人估价对称和非对称情况下投标报价过高策略对拍卖收益的影响.

In this paper,we focus on the incentives and opportunities for the bankrupt firm＇s first prior creditor-bankruptcy firm＇s staff-to influence the auction outcome in order to increase expected staff-debt recovery.It will be clearly elucidated that in the symmetric distribution of the values,as the first prior creditors,the staff may be liquidated the wages and labor insurance by financing a bidder in return for a joint bid strategy.This optimal coalition bid exceeds the bidder＇s private valuation（overbidding） by an amount which can ensure the staff＇s recovery of the ex ante debt impairment for the wages and labor insurance.In symmetric and asymmetric auction experiment with the unaffiliated bidders＇private valuations,we consider the effort of overbid for the expected auction revenue.