考虑共赢的电信业务创新动态激励合同研究

Study on dynamic incentive contracts in telecom business innovation with win-win consideration

用价值偏好参数修改了委托人(运营商)的目标函数,同时增加了代理人(服务提供商)对机会的选择决策,建立了运营商与服务提供商之间跨阶段的业务创新激励的委托代理模型,并分析了模型的均衡性质.结果表明:1)当价值偏好参数增大时,服务提供商相同阶段下最优生产性努力与机会性努力间的差值,以及不同阶段下最优生产性努力间的差值随之缩小;2)当隐性激励系数增大时,不同阶段下最优分享系数间的差值,以及相同阶段下最优生产性努力与机会性努力间的差值随之拉大,而不同阶段下的最优生产性努力间的差值则缩小.这些结果揭示了共赢对合同参数的影响,机会主义的根除不是运营商实现共赢目标的必要条件.

For the phenomena that classic principal-agent model can not reflect the win-win cooperation, and is less concerned about quantification of opportunistic behavior, this paper improves the principle＇s objective function with value preference parameter, and increases the agent＇s alternative decision to opportunism, then investigates the dynamic innovative contract design between a telecom operator and a service provider intensively, and makes further analysis about model equilibriums. The results show that 1） when the value preference parameter increases, the gaps between production efforts and opportunism efforts in the same stage and between the production efforts in different stages will reduce. 2） when the implicit incentive coefficient increases, the gaps between the sharing coefficients in different stages, and between production efforts and opportunism efforts in the same stage will increase, while the gap between the production efforts in different stages will reduce. All the above results reveal the impact of win-win consideration on contract parameters and also show that the eradication of opportunism is not the necessary condition for a telecom operator to achieve the win-win target.