摘要
In order to analyze the effects of different cooperative mechanisms between a mobile device manufacturer and a mobile network operator （ MNO ）, a Stackelberg structure is constructed. The manufacturer acts as a leader, while the MNO acts as a follower, i. e., a traditional retailer. Three cooperative mechanisms are considered： the manufacturer does not invest in developing the propriety function and software to support the infrastructure capacity of the MNO; the manufacturer invests in the development; the MNO offers a subsidy to encourage the manufacturer to invest in development. The results reveal that investing in the development can increase the profits of both the manufacturer and the MNO. Furthermore, if the MNO shares certain investment costs with the manufacturer, the MNO may charge higher prices of mobile connection services and mobile value-added services, and the profits of the two players may be enhanced.
通过建立Stackelberg模型,分析了移动装置制造商和移动网络运营商的不同合作机制带来的影响.移动装置制造商是领头企业,而移动网络运营商是尾随企业,即传统的零售商.主要研究了移动装置制造商与移动网络运营商的3种合作机制:移动装置制造商只开发通用的功能和软件,不针对移动网络运营商的网络特性开发适用的功能和软件;移动装置制造商投资开发适用于移动网络特性的功能和软件;移动网络运营商对移动装置制造商的开发投入进行补贴.结果显示:移动装置制造商投资开发适用的功能和软件可以同时增加两者的收益,并且当移动网络运营商承担一部分的投资成本时,移动网络运营商可以制定更高的移动连接服务和移动增值服务价格,从而得到更高的收益.
