多属性采购拍卖与多属性不对称纳什谈判的比较研究

A Comparison of Multidimensional Procurement Auction and Multidimensional Asymmetric Nash Bargaining

拍卖与谈判作为采购中有效选择交易对象的常见方式,从最大化采购方收益的角度看,现有理论对这2种方式各有支持。通过运用经典的多属性拍卖模型和多属性不对称纳什谈判模型,将拍卖的期望收益和谈判的收益进行比较,发现2种机制的分界与谈判力量和投标人数这2个指标有关,通过划分谈判力量和投标人数取值的不同区间,找到了拍卖或谈判这2种方式的边界条件以及它们各自的适宜范围。

As common and effective ways of selecting suppliers in procurement, auction and bargaining both have their supports in the current theory, from the perspective of the purchaser. By u sing the classical multidimensional auction model in and multidimensional asymmetric Nash bargaining model, to compare the expected revenue of auction with the earnings of bargaining, it is found that the boundary of the two mechanisms relates to the power of bargaining and the number of bidders. By dividing the interval of them, the boundary conditions of auction and bargaining and their respective appropriate ranges are also found.