《大学章句》中的“出发点丧失”问题

On the Issue of the "Loss of Starting Point" in Da xue zhang ju

先秦儒学史上,《中庸》对"过之"问题的强调,以及对由此引出的"真知"问题的处理,从根本上确立了心性论在儒学中的地位。宋明时代,《论语》、《大学》、《中庸》、《孟子》几经遴选最终脱颖而出,成为平起平坐的圣人之书。朱熹于"四书"之中最重《大学》。《大学章句》既是对《大学》的注释,同时也是在系统阐述朱子本人所服膺的修身之道。然而,《大学章句》在借用《中庸》、《孟子》的"性"概念时,几乎完全忽略了与之相应的"过之"与"真知"问题。顺此继续追踪,我们发现,《大学章句》虽设定了"仁义礼智之性",但实际上并未将其作为修身的出发点。在对"过之"与"真知"问题缺乏深刻体会的情况下,《大学章句》试图以"格物致知"作为获取真知的途径。然而,"格物致知"所蕴含的怀疑精神,最终却使实践者陷入了"不知该如何格致"的"出发点丧失"困境。

In the history of the pre-Qin Confucianism, the emphasis on the issue of ＂going too far＂ and the elicited issue of the disposition of ＂genuine knowledge＂ fundamentally established the position for theories of haman innate nature and heart/mind in Confucianism. From the Song to the Ming dynasties （960 - 1644）, the Four Books of Confucius＇Analects, The Great Leaning, The Doctrine of the Mean, and Mencius experienced selections time and again and finally stood out from other literatures, turning out to be the sages ＂discourses. For the four books, Zhu Xi （ 1130 - 1200） paid most attention to Da xue （the Great Leaning）. His Da xue zhang ju is not only an exegesis on the Great Leaning, but also a systematical elucidation of Zhu Xi himself sincerely believed the Dan （Way） of self-cultivation. But in borrowing the concept of human innate nature, Da xue zhangju almost completely neglected the corresponded issues of ＂going too far＂ and ＂genuine knowledge＂. Following this clue, we can find though Da xue zhangju proposed human innate nature of benevolence, rectitude, rituals, and wisdom, it does not take it as starting point of self-cuhivation. Under the circumstance of the lack of in-depth understanding of the issues of ＂going too far＂ and ＂genuine knowledge＂, Da xue zhangju attempted to take ＂ge wu zh/zh/ { plumbing into objects to attain knowledge）＂ as an approach to genuine knowledge. But the skepticism conceived in ge wu zhi zhi at last makes the practitioner lapse into the plight in which he is unable to know how to plumb into the objects and cannot discern the starting point.