逆选择机制下的中小企业融资分析——非对称信息下银行与中小企业的委托代理模型

An Analysis Based on Adverse Selection Mechanism for SME Finance:Asymmetric Information between Banks and SME under the Principal-Agent Model

中小企业融资难问题是经济学界普遍关注的问题,其核心在于信息的非对称性。由于信息非对称,会诱发逆向选择和道德风险,导致中小企业在金融市场上被信贷配给。本文综述了前人的研究成果,并从信息问题出发,运用委托代理理论,在信息经济学的框架下分析和研究逆选择机制的发生及中小企业融资问题的根本所在,通过对完全信息和非对称信息下的合同进行对比分析,指出信息的重要性,最终从信息完善的视角,提出破解中小企业融资难问题的相关政策建议。

Financing of SMEs is the issue general concern in economic circles.Its core is the information asymmetry.Due to asymmetric information may induce adverse selection and moral hazard,will lead to credit rationing for SMEs in financial market.This paper first summarizes the results of previous studies,then starting from the information problems,using principal-agent theory,analyzes and studies the occurrence mechanism of adverse selection under information economics＇ frame,at last indicates the fundamental to the financing of SMEs.Through comparative analysis between the contract under complete information and asymmetric information,this article points out the importance of information.Finally,from the perspective of perfect information,we try to proposed relevant policy recommendations for solving the problem of financing SMEs.