摘要
商业银行的国有产权性质以及银行并购法律体系不完善等原因,导致我国长期以来出现政府居于主导者地位但却忽视常规审查者、垄断审查者职责等错位现象。而政府角色错位必然产生并购效率低下、削弱优势银行竞争实力等弊端,难以适应经济全球化和我国金融业对外全面开放的新形势。因此,应通过改革银行产权制度和完善银行并购法律体系等途径以淡化政府对银行并购的直接干预,赋予政府在银行并购中监管者和服务者的角色定位,同时合理调整其救济者角色。
Due to the disproportionately large share of state-owned shares in commercial banks and the imperfect legal system resulted in the government-led mergers and acquisitions,the current role of government brought about inefficient bank MA,and undermined the competitive advantages of banks.It isn't suited to the new situation of economic globalization and the all-round liberalization of China's financial sector.We need to gradually dilute the government's direct intervention,and strengthen its role of regulator and service provider.At the same time,the government's role of relief needs to be adjusted.To meet this target,we must fundamentally optimize the ownership structure of commercial banks,and improve the legal system of commercial bank mergers and acquisitions.
出处
《中国行政管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第11期65-68,共4页
Chinese Public Administration
基金
国家软科学研究计划项目"我国银行业市场退出机制研究"(项目编号:2010GXS5D242)的阶段性成果
关键词
银行并购
政府角色
产权制度改革
Bank M&A
government role
reform of property rights