摘要
本文使用2003～2010年51家商业银行的数据检验了银行董事会结构的内生决定因素及其对银行收益与风险的影响。研究表明:董事会规模与银行规模正相关,与其贷款领域负相关,与以资产收益率衡量的CEO谈判力量显著负相关。在董事会独立性方面,董事会独立性与银行多样化经营程度显著正相关,与以资产收益率和行长年龄衡量的CEO谈判力量负相关。在董事会结构对银行收益和风险的影响方面,董事会规模与银行资产收益率负相关,董事会独立性与银行资产收益率正相关,但均不显著;董事会规模和独立性均与银行不良贷款率正相关。
Based on 51 commercial banks＇ data from 2003 to 2010, this paper examines the endogenous determinants of bank＇ s board structure and their impacts on bank＇ s revenue and risks. The results of the paper show that： board size is positively impacted by bank size, but is negatively correlated to bank loan areas and CEO＇s negotiation power which is represented by ROA. Board independence is positively related to bank diversification level and negatively impacted by CEO＇s negotiation power which can be evaluated by ROA and CEO＇s age. In terms of the impacts of bank board structure on revenue and risks, the board＇s size and independence have positive and negative, but not significant, impacts on bank＇s ROE respectively.
出处
《金融论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2011年第11期3-9,共7页
Finance Forum
基金
国家社科基金重大招标项目(10ZD&035)
教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划(NCET-10-0517)"
山东大学自主创新项目(IFW09147)的部分研究成果
关键词
商业银行
董事会
独立董事
资产收益率
commercial banks
board of directors
independent director
ROA
