对我国政府信息公开制度的思考——基于不完全信息动态博弈模型

Government Information Disclosure in China——Based on Dynamic Game with Incomplete Information

政府在信息公开过程中一方面要最大限度地满足公众知情权需求,同时也要考虑到信息公开制度运行的经济效率。在成本交易和产权分析理论的基础上,建立政府与公众的不完全信息动态博弈模型,考察双方在信息公开制度中的最优策略选择。研究建议政府部门应该树立正确的信息公开观念,在立法体例上准确界定信息公开的范围并充分利用信息公开的信息反馈机制获知公众对知情权的需求。

The government should maximize to meet the needs of the public right to know while try to make government information disclosure more economic. Based on transaction cost theory and property right theory, this paper makes dynamic game with incomplete information accolxting to the strategies between the public and the government on government information disclosure. To make the government and put,lie benefit maximized, according to the conclusion, the paper suggests that the government department should pay much attention to the importance of the govermnent information disclosure and make the scope of the content of information disclosure set by the rules of the law and make the most of information feedback mechanism to meet the needs of the public.