财政分权、政府层级与企业过度投资--来自地区上市公司面板数据的经验证据

Fiscal Decentralization,Governmental Levels and Corporate Over-investment:Empirical Evidence from Panel Data of Regional Listed Companies

文章以我国2001-2007年的上市公司为研究样本,探讨了地区财政分权程度与国有公司所属的政府层级对企业过度投资行为的影响。研究发现,财政分权越不充分的地区,其所控制的国有公司和属地民营公司越有可能存在过度投资行为;相对于中央政府控制的国有公司,地方政府控制的国有公司和属地民营公司更有可能存在过度投资行为;地方政府的层级越低,其所控制的国有公司越有可能存在过度投资行为;GDP增速越慢的地区,其所控制的国有公司和属地民营公司越有可能存在过度投资行为。

Based on a sample of listed companies from 2001 to 2007, this paper studies the effects of regional fiscal decentralization and the levels of governments which state-owned companies belong to on corporate over-investment. It shows that in the regions with more inadequate fiscal decentralization, the stateowned companies controlled by local governments and local private companies are more likely to over-invest. And compared to state-owned companies controlled by the central government, the state-owned companies controlled by local governments and local private companies are more likely to over-invest. The state-owned companies controlled by local governments with lower levels have the higher possibility of over-investment. In addition, in the region with slower GDP growth, the state-owned companies controlled by local governments and local private companies are also more likely to over-invest.