全流通环境下投资者利益保护研究——控股股东、中小股东和经理人三方博弈分析

Study on Investor Protection under Full Circulation of Stocks:Analysis Based on Tripartite Game among Controlling Shareholders,Minority Shareholders and Managers

随着上市公司控制权的转移,投资者保护在全流通环境下有了新的内涵。文章从公司的委托代理问题出发,构建了控股股东、中小股东和经理人的三方博弈模型。各方决策的混合策略纳什均衡结果显示,股权的集中在一定程度上可以抑制公司的"内部人控制";为保护投资者利益,应对控股股东和经理人的违规操作进行严厉惩罚,降低投资者的监督稽查成本,健全上市公司的治理机制。

With the transfer of listed corporate control, investor protection under full circulation of stocks has a new meaning. This paper constructs a model concerning tripartite game among controlling shareholders, minority shareholders and managers from the angle of corporate principal-agent problem. The solution to mixed strategic Nash equilibrium indicates that equity concentration can help to inhibit corporate insider control to some extent; in order to protect the interests of investors, controlling shareholders and managers who implement illegal operations should be punished severely, and the investors＇ supervision cost should reduce; in addition, governance mechanisms of listed companies should be improved.