粮食安全视角下地方政府征地行为博弈分析

The Analysis of Local Government's Behavior of Land Acquisition with Game Theory Perspective to Food Security

粮食安全战略最终只是国家层次的目标,中央政府与地方政府发展战略目标的不一致导致粮食安全行动策略的差异,地方政府受经济利益驱动的影响,往往在征地行为中未顾及到粮食安全计划,本文从经济发展与粮食安全的角度构建地方政府间利益博弈模型,分析地方政府征地策略选择概率的限制因素,提出地方政府策略选择区间受机会成本条件约束和替代弹性约束的限制。对地方政府征地行为的分析,有助于促进土地政策的制定与实施,加强对地方政府征地行为的监管与约束,协调现阶段经济发展与农地保护和粮食安全的矛盾。

The food security strategy is only the national level goal finally; the Central authorities cause the food security strategy not identically with the Local authority resulting from theirs difference of developmental goal. The local governments don＇t always consider of the plan of food security, which is driven by the economic interests. From the view of economic development and food security, we build the local government＇s interest game model, analysis the constraints and evolution laws of the probability Oof local government＇s strategy choice, put forward the range of local governments ＇ strategy choice which is limited by the constraints of opportunity cost and the constraints of the substitution elasticity. The analysis of local government＇s behavior of land acquisition could also promote the development and implementation of land policies, strengthen the supervision and constraints of local government＇s land acquisitions, and coordinate the conflicts of economic development and agricultural land conservation and food security.