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道德风险监管的最优激励合约设计

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摘要 委托人在遭遇双重道德风险问题的情况下,可通过设计一个恰当的薪酬合约,诱导监管人采用最符合委托人利益的信息结构。但这种内生性选择的信息结构并不必然是最准确的,它的准确度依赖于监管技术、监管人的保留效用以及代理人的生产技术。虽然在考虑监管人信息不诚实披露问题时将减少委托人的福利,但可改善社会效率。
出处 《金融理论与教学》 2011年第5期52-57,共6页 Finance Theory and Teaching
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参考文献8

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二级参考文献38

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