道德实践中的认知、意愿与性格——论程朱对“知而不行”的解释

Knowing,Will and Character in Moral Practice:A Study on Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi's Explanations of"Knowing without Doing"

“知而不行”是生活中常见的现象，比如，一个人知道吸烟不好，却依然吸烟；知道应该帮助他人，却没有付诸行动。儒学，尤其是宋明理学，作为一种强调道德修养和道德实践的学问，对道德领域的“知而不行”现象，给予了更多关注。从二程到朱熹到王阳明，都对这个问题做过正面回应，其中蕴含了值得注意的哲学观点。在西方哲学中，“知而不行”问题与意志软弱（akrasia，weaknessofwill）问题联系在一起，从古代的苏格拉底、亚里士多德，到中世纪的奥古斯丁、阿奎那，再到近代的休谟、康德乃至当代的戴维森，很多哲学家都留下了关于这个问题的看法。①晚近一些海外中国哲学研究者尝试结合西方哲学的相关理论，对中国哲学中的意志软弱问题做比较研究。②本文将聚焦于朱熹及其理论先导程颐的有关论述，运用道德哲学话语分析他们对“知而不行”问题的解释，并探讨其对当代关于道德行动的研究有怎样的启示。

＂Knowing without doing＂ is a common phenomenon in human life, which contains a philosophical puzzle that why people don＇t do what they think right. Focusing on the case of Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, this paper makes a complete investigation on the explanations of ＂knowing without doing＂ in Chinese philosophy. It holds that Cheng and Zhu＇s explanations can be divided into three dimensions which correspond separately with knowing, will and character. Comparing with the Western philosophy, Cheng and Zhu＇s thinking presents a characteristic of comprehensiveness. Some statements of Cheng and Zhu, such as the sayings about ＂seeing principle＂, ＂self-abandon＂, ＂weakness＂ and ＂material endowment＂, are all representatives of Han philo- sophical thinking, which would be a useful source for the related discussions in the contemporary moral philos- ophy, philosophy of mind and theory of action.