基于演化博弈的干部管理问题

On Cadre Management Problems Based on Evolutionary Game

为研究干部管理问题,借助演化博弈理论,建立党政主要领导和其他班子成员博弈的支付矩阵,从动态的角度来考察党政主要领导和其他班子成员在完成工作时策略的演化过程,利用复制动态方程求得党政主要领导和其他班子成员博弈的演化稳定策略。最后通过对该模型进行数值仿真,对比分析了在选择策略初始人群比例,奖励分配和过失承担几方面发生变化时对党政主要领导和其他班子成员策略选择的影响。仿真实验结果为组织部门在干部管理科学化方面提供了一定的理论依据。

To the problem of cadre management, the evolutionary game theory is adopted to build the payoff matrix between the chief leaders of the party and government and other members of the organization. And the evolutionary process of the strategies used by the chief leaders of the party and government and other members of the organization are analyzed from dynamic perspective. The evolutionary stable strategies are obtained through replicator dynamic equations. The numerical simulation example of the model is given to compare the results in the case that the initial proportion of the group choosing strategy, rewards allocation and the responsibility undertaking are changed. Some theoretical basis are provided for the organization departments in cadre management.