“普韦布洛”号危机决策与美国的国际危机管理

Policy-making in the Pueblo Crisis and America's International Crisis Management

面对中苏同盟已然破裂的时局,1968年"普韦布洛"号危机发生前后约翰逊政府最高决策层以及大部分情报和军事部门在很大程度上依旧坚持"共产主义铁板一块"的观点,对朝鲜抓捕"普韦布洛"号的可能性和意图做出了错误判断。权衡利弊之后,美国并未对朝鲜采取报复行动,而是接受了朝鲜的谈判提议。在美国政府确定谈判策略的过程中,人道主义关怀明显从属于维护国家声望与避免伤害盟国等政治考虑,板门店秘密会谈久拖未决。虽然"普韦布洛"号危机是加速美国国际危机管理程序制度化的动因之一,也曾促使美国致力于防止海上冲突事件的再次发生,但此后的美国决策者却未能顺理成章地从中汲取应有的经验教训。

Even when faced with the Sino-Soviet split,the top policy-makers of the Johnson Administration and most intelligence and military agencies were misled,to a great extent,by the belief that 'communism remains a monolithic bloc' during the Pueblo Crisis.As a result,they misjudged the likelihood and intentions of North Korea' s seizure of the' USS Pueblo.After weighing the pros and cons,the United States refrained from retaliation and agreed to negotiate with North Korea.During this policy-making process,humanitarian concerns were clearly subordinate to the political considerations of safeguarding the national prestige of the United States and attending to the feelings of its allies.Consequently,the secret negotiations at Panmunjom were fruitlessly prolonged.The Pueblo Crisis contributed to the institutionalization of U.S.international crisis management and stimulated the country's efforts to prevent similar maritime incidents.However,later U.S.policy-makers did not learn as much from the crisis as might have been expected.