期刊文献+

双边佣金约束的荷式拍卖问题研究

Dutch Auction with the Constraint of Dual Commission
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摘要 对于各种交易方式来说,荷式拍卖在农副产品交易中占有重要地位,具有广泛的发现产品市场需求和形成合适市场价格的作用。中国的农产品流通模式呈现"小生产,大流通"的特点,在这种流通模式下,拍卖行的存在,对农产品交易起着举足轻重的作用。拍卖行为买卖双方提供交易服务,并收取一定佣金。在标准拍卖模型中引入佣金变量,分析买卖双方同时支付佣金时的均衡策略,可得出竞买人数作为内生变量时,佣金结构变化所带来的影响。 Among various forms of transaction, Dutch auction plays an important role in transactions of agricultural and sideline products~ extensively finding market demand and forming appropriate market price. The circulation of agricultural products in China is characterized by "small-scale production and large-scale circulation", under which auction houses play a decisive part. They offer services for buyers and sellers and charge commissions. This paper introduces the commission variable in standard auction model to analyze the equilibrium strategy when both the buyer and seller pay commission and discuss the effect of changes in commission structure with the number of bidders as an endogenous variable.
出处 《贵州财经学院学报》 北大核心 2011年第6期32-36,共5页 Journal of Guizhou College of Finance and Economics
基金 国家自然科学基金项目资助(71062006) 云南省应用基金项目资助(2009ZC019M)
关键词 佣金指数 荷式拍卖 均衡期望收益 竞买人数 commission index Dutch auction expected equilibrium revenue number of bidders
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参考文献8

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二级参考文献32

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