基于无缺陷产品退货的供应链协调机制研究

Study on Coordination Mechanism of Supply Chains Based on False Failure Returns

通过数理模型,研究了单一制造商和零售商的供应链下,存在无缺陷产品退货时,集中式和分散式供应链模式的最优决策,得出了最优水平都是努力的边际成本系数的减函数,同时都是边际退货量减少系数的增函数,且集中式供应链下的最优水平都分别高于分散式供应链。以及制造商通过目标减量返利合同激励零售商,使得分散式供应链下的最优决策与集中式供应链一致,此时的最优批发价格等于生产成本,最优的无缺陷产品退货目标量与零售商最优努力水平成反比。

By the study of the optimal decisions of the centralized supply chain and the decentralized supply chain, there are false failure returns, and the supply chain is with only a manufacturer and a retailer by the quantity model. It could be concluded that the optimal levels are the decreased functions of the effort marginal cost coefficient and the increased functions of the marginal returns reduced coefficient; the optimal levels of the centralized supply chain are bigger than those of the decentralized supply chain. The manufacturer could make the target rebates contract inspire the retailer, and the contract could make the optimal decisions of the decentralized supply chain same to the centralized supply chain. At the moment the optimal wholesale price is equal to the product cost, and the target returns are the decreased function of the optimal effort level of the retailer.