代理人私人收益及其对风险投资时机的影响

Agent's Private Benefits and Their Impacts of Venture Capital Timing

文章基于风险投资过程中投资人(委托人)与创业投资家(代理人)之间的信息不对称建立期权博弈模型,从投资人的角度对代理人的私人收益进行分类研究,最终为风险投资的进入设计出最优契约。在存在委托代理问题的情况下,使委托人可以通过该契约约束代理人的期权执行时刻,避免其提前或推迟投资,错过最佳进入时机,并付给代理人报酬作为激励。

Asymmetry information between investors（principal） and manager（agent） always exists in the process of venture capital investment.The paper establishes an option game model from the view of investors in order to study the manager＇s private benefits and designs an optimal contract for the entrance of venture capital.In the presence of principal-agent problem situation,the option＇s executing time is bounded by the contract,so that the agent would not miss optimal entry time by advancing or delaying their investment.The principal must be paid to the agent as an incentive means.