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中小企业联保贷款的约束机制及成员规模的确定 被引量:9

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摘要 产业集群内中小企业联保贷款的横向监督和社会资本约束能有效降低贷款的道德风险,实质性地降低贷款的交易成本和贷款的抵押品要求,有利于提高偿还率,并能在很大程度上避免违约不还贷的多米诺骨牌效应。但因受集体行动逻辑的制约,联保贷款团体的成员规模不能过度扩张,因而发展多个联保贷款团体是解决集群内中小企业融资难问题的一个可选办法。
出处 《中南财经政法大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第6期113-120,共8页 Journal of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law
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