农村低保瞄准偏差的博弈分析——以宁夏盐池县增记畔村为例

Game analysis on the target bias of rural minimum living standard——A case study of Zengjipan village,Yanchi county,Ningxia

通过对宁夏盐池县增记畔村进行实地调查,从博弈角度对农村低保瞄准偏差进行分析。结果表明:基层乡镇一级、村一级以及农户之间存在一个三方博弈关系。村一级与农户之间的博弈中村一级占据优势;乡一级与村一级之间的博弈中乡一级占据优势,村一级处于劣势;乡一级与农户之间最终博弈结局的帕累托最优为(评理,拒绝)。进一步针对分析结果提出建议:大力发展县域经济,为低保政策的贯彻实施提供有力的资金支持;建立低保对象确立过程中的激励制度;增强基层主管单位的监督暗访制度。

Through field surveys of Zengjipan village, Yanchi county, Ningxia, the target bias of rural minimum living from the perspective of game theory was analyzed. The results showed that： there were a tripartite game relationship among the town government, village and farmers. Village always occupied advantage between village and farmers; the town government always occupied advantage between village and town government; the town government existed game with farmers, and the Pareto optimal of the game result was best （judging, refusing）. Furthermore, we recommended for the analysis of the results： we should develop county economic vigorously, support the funds for the implementation of the policy of rural minimum living; build incentive system of the establishment of the rural minimum living object; enhance the system of basic units＇ monitoring and unannounced visits.