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“效率优先、兼顾公平”与财政分权的激励效应 被引量:4

Giving Priority to Efficiency with Due Consideration to Fairness and Incentive Effect of Fiscal Decentralization
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摘要 经典的Qian and Roland(QR,1998)财政分权模型中,分权因素外生决定经济增长。本文认为"效率优先、兼顾公平"战略性原则决定了中国财政分权必然内生于这一过程。它使得分权激励经历着由锦标赛与薪酬福利共同激励逐渐演变为薪酬福利激励为主的过程。为此,我们在一个更具一般性的拓展的QR模型框架中完成了对中国分权改革的再考察。并给出经验证据支持了理论模型的推论。本文证实了:经济增长率较低地区,"效率优先、兼顾公平"会使分权与锦标赛激励效应的正相关性较经济增长率较高地区更强。此外,且无论是经济增长率较低还是经济增长率较高地区,"效率优先、兼顾公平"均会使分权与薪酬福利激励效应间存在强度相似的显著正相关性。 Fiscal decentralization determines the economic growth exogenously in classical Qian and Roland (QR, 1998 ) model. We believe that the stragic principle of "giving priority to efficiency with due consideration to fairness" determines the change of chinese fiscal decentralization, which brings the incentive effect of fiscal decentralizaton from the joint effect of championship and remuneration to the single effect of championship. By expanding the QR modal, We set up a genenal model to reconsider the reform of chinese fiscal decentralization, and give evidence to support our theoritical model. We find, because of the principle of Giving priority to efficiency with due consideration to fairness, in regions with lower economic growth rate, the relationship between fiscal decentralization and Incentive effect of championship is stronger positive than that in regions with higher economic growth rate, while the positive relationship between fiscal decentralization and Incentive effect of remuneration is almost the same significant and strong in all regions.
出处 《中国经济问题》 CSSCI 北大核心 2011年第6期3-15,共13页 China Economic Studies
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(09YJC790052) 国家自然科学青年基金项目(71003030) 国家社科基金青年项目(10CJY068) 国家社科基金重大项目(09&ZD021)
关键词 “效率优先 兼顾公平” 财政分权 锦标激励 薪酬福利激励 giving priority to efficiency with due consideration to fairness fiscal decentralization incentive effect of cham- pionship incentive effect of remuneration
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